Version imprimableThe submission of the Lebanese state
The framework agreement between Beirut and Tel Aviv follows direct negotiations between the two governments, under the sponsorship of Washington. Criticized for pursuing direct negotiations with Israeli officials, perceived as a free concession and without any real strategy for an Israeli quid pro quo, Lebanese officials justified this choice as the only way to stop the Israeli war against Lebanon. However, this is far from the case, as the Israeli army continues its occupation and military actions in Lebanon in total violation of the ceasefire, with deaths, injuries and destruction.
In addition to having as its horizon “a complete and lasting peace, bringing security, stability and prosperity to the peoples of Israel and Lebanon”, the content of the framework agreement and its security annex – mentioned three times in the text – are centred on the disarmament of Hezbollah. Moreover, the military actions of the Israeli occupation army in Lebanon are described as resulting “exclusively from attacks, threats and hostile intentions emanating from non-state armed groups, in particular Hezbollah”, in total contradiction with the historical dynamics of Tel Aviv’s repeated wars against Lebanon and occupations of Lebanese territory with destruction in all directions.
In this spirit, it is stated that the “gradual redeployment” of the Israeli occupation army from southern Lebanon is dependent on the “disarmament of Hezbollah and all other non-state armed groups” by the Lebanese army. The security annex also lists the mechanism for the so-called “pilot areas” south of the Litani River, where the Lebanese army is to gradually replace the Israeli occupation army. [2] In this context, it is envisaged that the Israeli and Lebanese governments will set up “a military coordination group, with the support and participation of the United States, to ensure the full implementation of this Framework”. [3]
In this framework, there is no deadline for the withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces from the occupied Lebanese territories, while leaving it to the Israeli government to assess according to its own considerations whether Hezbollah – or any other non-state armed group in Lebanon – constitutes a threat to be eradicated in the chosen area. Moreover, during a tour of a “security zone” delimited by the “yellow line” and equivalent to more than 600 km2 occupied in South Lebanon, which extends up to ten kilometres deep in the territory, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu affirmed in front of his troops that “we will not leave southern Lebanon until the threat is eliminated. As long as Hezbollah, armed, is present and threatens us, we will stay". [4] The day before, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz had also stressed that the Israeli occupation forces will not withdraw “one millimetre” from southern Lebanon until Hezbollah surrenders its weapons. He added that he did not believe that the Lebanese army “will suddenly become composed of lions charging at Hezbollah,” and that the Israeli occupation of the south will be “therefore long-term,” and that the “Shia” villages in the border strip “must go.” [5]
Prior to that, on 15 June, the same minister had declared, after the announcement that the United States and Iran had reached a ceasefire encompassing Lebanon, that the Israeli occupation forces would remain “in the safe zones in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza for an indefinite period” and that these areas would be “cleared of their inhabitants, and that all terrorist infrastructure [...] including the houses of the villages on the line of contact that were used as terrorist strongholds, would be destroyed”. [6]
Moreover, any future reconstruction process in Lebanon must take place under the full control of the Lebanese state and above all aim to “prevent funds from being disbursed to any entity, organization or person affiliated with non-state armed groups and to take available legal measures to prohibit the activities of any entity, organization or person of that type.” This provision signals a willingness to continue attacks on civilian organizations linked to Hezbollah, such as the Qard al-Hassan institution or others such as the Jihad al-Binaa party’s construction company, and goes far beyond the military component. Moreover, on 30 June, the member states of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), founded in 2017 and bringing together the United States and the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait), announced a series of sanctions targeting several “key Hezbollah infrastructures”. such as al-Qard al-Hassan and Bayt al-Mal (which had already been under US sanctions since 2007 and 2006 respectively). [7] Again, as was the case after the 2024 Israeli war against Lebanon, a potential future reconstruction process and an influx of financial aid to Lebanon is linked to the disarmament of Hezbollah and normalization with Israel.
Finally, the agreement stipulates that both parties “undertake to take measures in good faith showing positive intent, including the cessation of any hostile or prejudicial action within international political or legal bodies”. In other words, it amounts to the renunciation of the Lebanese state – but not of its citizens or associations – to sue the Israeli government for the war crimes committed in Lebanon, which cost the lives of thousands of civilians between the wars of 2024 and 2026 (more than 4,000 deaths in the 2024 war and, since the beginning of March 2026, more than 4,200 people have been killed and more than one million people have been forced to leave their homes), and have caused the destruction of tens of thousands of homes and dozens of localities. According to a study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Conseil national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) published in June 2026, southern Lebanon has suffered damage estimated at more than $1 billion as of April 29, 2026, with more than 11,000 buildings totally destroyed for a total bill of about $1.38 billion 12 while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has published an assessment of the damage to buildings in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, covering the period from 1 February to 14 April 2026, amounting to 146 buildings destroyed and 264 partially damaged, at an estimated cost of $365 million.13 This is in addition to the multiple destructions of the 2024 war, estimated at more than $7 billion in direct damage, not including economic losses estimated at $13 billion.
The objective of this framework agreement is clear: to ensure that the Lebanese army, under the leadership of its government, leads the disarmament of Hezbollah and marginalizes the Lebanese party in any future reconstruction process, all for the benefit of US and Israeli security and political interests.
Submission to US and Israeli interests
The content of the framework agreement reflects the deepening of the political orientation of a fraction of the Lebanese ruling class, represented by Lebanese president Joseph Aoun, his prime minister Nawaf Salam, and some other parties of the traditional Maronite right in favour of normalization with the state of Israel. Among them, the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb. This orientation consists of allying with Western and regional powers, in order to consolidate their power and reduce the influence of Hezbollah and its Iranian ally in Lebanon, seeking to disarm it, and to fight against its informal financial circuits and networks and even to weaken its network of civil organizations.
Supporting this orientation, the head of the Lebanese Forces (LF), Samir Geagea, hailed “the most important political initiative of the Lebanese state in half a century”, judging that the agreement will allow Israeli withdrawal from the south and “get rid of the existence of armed organisations outside the state, first and foremost Hezbollah”. [8]
The political orientation of this faction of the Lebanese ruling class, led by the president and prime minister, was strengthened following the outbreak of the US-Israeli war against Iran and the latest Israeli war against Lebanon, counting in particular on a weakening of these two actors, or even a defeat for Tehran. However, the signing of the memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran has dashed these hopes. This protocol stipulated, among other things, “the immediate and definitive cessation of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon”, between the two countries and their allies and the creation of a “deconfliction cell” to consolidate the so-called ceasefire in the country.
Instead of seeking potential tactical and temporary coordination with Iran and other states in the region such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, to strengthen the Lebanese position in its negotiations with Israel under the sponsorship of the U.S. government, the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States and the inclusion of Lebanon in it were perceived as a threat by the Lebanese president and prime minister in their desire to consolidate their power against Hezbollah and its Iranian ally. Throughout the last Israeli war against Lebanon and the negotiations between the two actors, the Lebanese government has therefore worked to cut all ties with the negotiations between Iran and the United States.
Indeed, this faction of the Lebanese ruling class preferred to bet on a US-sponsored security and political agreement with Israel seeking to disarm Hezbollah without any real serious Israeli counterparts and guarantees, except for symbolic words about Lebanese sovereignty. All this in order to prevent Iran from including Lebanon in these negotiations, with the aim of protecting its main ally and agent of influence in Lebanon, Hezbollah, even in disregard of the rights of the Lebanese state and its sovereignty, as explained above. Taking advantage of this situation, the United States pressured the Lebanese authorities to obtain even more concessions for its Israeli ally and to serve its political interests.
Thus, while affirming since taking office in January 2025 that they want to achieve and ensure Lebanon’s “sovereignty”, and despite the limits to achieving such an objective16, the Lebanese president and his ruling allies have reinforced their political dependence on the United States. Not to mention that this strategy neglects the fact that Washington is not a neutral intermediary between Lebanon and Israel, quite the contrary. The occupations and wars of the Israeli occupation army against Lebanon are only possible with the support of Washington, as is the ongoing genocide in the Gaza Strip. The US government, for example, did not put pressure on Israel during the previous ceasefire in November 2024. The Israeli occupation army has continued almost daily attacks on Lebanon, resulting in hundreds of deaths, dozens of abductions, thousands of injuries, and more than 15,000 ceasefire violations by the Israeli occupation forces, both by land, air and sea. In addition, Tel Aviv, with US support, has blocked any reconstruction in the south, including that of several border villages razed to the ground.
Moreover, the opposite is true: it was the US president who imposed the ceasefire with Iran, however fragile, and the reduction of Israeli violence in Lebanon, to which Netanyahu had to submit, not without reluctance. This is reflected in the statements of Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz, who regretted the “link established between the Lebanese and Iranian fronts by Trump”, following the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States announced in mid-June and signed on 17 June, and which provides in its first article for a ceasefire in Lebanon. He added that “when President Trump linked the Iranian and Lebanese files, we stopped destroying buildings in Beirut. The link between the two fronts responds to an American interest, and it is one of the constraints of our partnership with the United States”. [9]
In addition, the Lebanese government faces many obstacles and challenges in implementing the points of the framework agreement. Beyond the limits of the Lebanese army’s capabilities and infrastructure, many military officials do not look favourably on this agreement and the process of disarming Hezbollah in the current political conditions, characterized by ongoing wars and occupations against Lebanon. The Lebanese army has not been spared from the Israeli occupying army’s bombings and attacks, including the death of its members. Moreover, such a process against Hezbollah would also risk compromising the unity of the army, which is composed of more than a third of Shiites, and creating sectarian tensions and violence in the country. Its commander-in-chief, Rodolphe Haykal, has already made statements in the past opposing the use of force against Hezbollah, fearing a bloodbath and the division of the army.
Similarly, such an agreement, to go further, for example to become a real peace agreement as mentioned in the text, would need the approval of parliament, which would meet with the opposition of Hezbollah and Amal, but also probably with other groups concerned about the significant concessions made to Israel. Indeed, this framework agreement also meets with opposition within Lebanese society, which goes beyond Hezbollah and its ally Amal.
Opposition to agreement goes beyond Hezbollah
Hezbollah denounced the agreement, describing it as a “serious mistake”, and its secretary general Naim Kassem deemed as “extremely dangerous" the condition of the complete disarmament of the party throughout Lebanese territory prior to any Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. It “crosses all red lines and makes Lebanon a plaything in the hands of the Israeli enemy”. He added that this agreement was “null and void”. [10] The deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political bureau, Mahmoud Comati, assured that the party “will not allow its implementation” and would deal with it “by all possible means and methods”. [11]
The Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and leader of the Amal movement, Nabih Berry, said that the Lebanon-Israel agreement was “contradictory and impossible to implement” because, in his view, it was contrary to all logic and out of step with Arab and international positions, and did not meet any of the conditions necessary for its success or implementation. [12] He added that “the main thing now is to restore the unity of the home front and to restore the unity of the home front. to reach a consensus among the Lebanese in order to prevent Israel from achieving its objectives, whether through war, division or internal confrontation”.
Both parties welcomed the Iranian-American memorandum of understanding, and Iran’s achievement of a ceasefire for Lebanon, which, while reducing the intensity of Tel Aviv’s attacks, was regularly violated by the Israeli occupation army in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah representatives continue to insist that Tehran has “levers of pressure” on Washington, which in turn could pressure Israel to withdraw from Lebanon.
However, the agreement is not only opposed by Hezbollah and its ally Amal, but by other Lebanese political sectors. Druze leader and former PSP leader Walid Jumblatt described the agreement as “a capitulation to Israel” and regretted the “total omission” of the 1949 armistice agreement between Lebanon and Israel in the text of the framework agreement, as well as the use of the term “occupation.” He concluded by calling for the formation of “a front of political opposition to this agreement”. [13]
However, he qualified these remarks a few days later by declaring “we are not going to be part of a political coalition to bring down the text. We are not going to support it either”. [14] Other political actors have already voiced criticism of the agreement, such as the Free Patriotic Movement – and its leader Gebran Bassil has already spoken with Nabih Berri – the Armenian Tashnag party, and MPs from the Sunni community, including relatives of former prime minister Saad Hariri and others identified with the popular protests of 2019.
The faction of the Lebanese ruling class opposed to this framework agreement hopes to count on the support of several regional actors such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey, who do not wish to see an extension of US hegemony based mainly on the alliance with Israel and the United Arab Emirates in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region to the detriment of their interests. Some of these countries played a significant role in the negotiations to conclude the memorandum of understanding, or supported it, because the leaders of these states understood that a total defeat of Iran and a strengthening of Israeli influence in the region did not serve their interests. These leaders, who are also close allies of the United States and do not seek to challenge US hegemony in the region or to oppose a regional normalization of the state of Israel, with which they have official or unofficial relations, perceive Israel’s warlike and expansionist policies as a source of instability and threats to their own national interests and regional influences. In the absence of communication on the subject, Saudi Arabia’s position is still unclear regarding the framework agreement or how the kingdom wishes to approach it, unlike that of the United Arab Emirates, which has welcomed it. Similarly, the Gulf Cooperation Council, of which Riyadh is the most important player, issued a statement the day before the agreement welcoming the continuation of negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv and the possibility of a peace agreement.
The Lebanese Communist Party, for its part, said in a statement entitled “Uniting efforts to bring down the shameful Lebanese-Israeli agreement” that “the agreement signed in Washington between the Lebanese government delegation and Israel constitutes a dangerous precedent of submission and capitulation, given the major concessions made by the Lebanese delegation. This agreement effectively endorses the continuation of the Zionist occupation of large parts of southern Lebanon, without any mention of a withdrawal or even a timetable.” Moreover, the party also adds that the framework agreement “transforms the Zionist enemy into an ally with which to cooperate, and Hezbollah into an enemy to be attacked,” which could lead to “an unacceptable internal conflict that only serves the interests of the Zionist enemy.” [15]
Internal discord
Following the conclusion of the framework agreement, some political tension was expressed by a modest demonstration in Beirut by Hezbollah and Amal supporters rejecting the agreement, or by the burning on the road leading to Beirut International Airport of signs supporting the government’s position displaying “Lebanon First” and “Lebanon brings us together” with a Lebanese flag on a red background, which had replaced signs thanking Iran. These tensions are compounded by those accumulated during this last war, particularly among the Shiite populations against the Lebanese government.
In the following days, the various factions of the Lebanese ruling class appealed for civil peace in Lebanon not to be jeopardised. Nawaf Salam and Nabih Berry affirmed their rejection of “any form of discord” between the Lebanese and any “attempt at national division”.
These remarks were followed by those of the deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political bureau, Mahmoud Comati, who considered that the agreement did not “merit” a mobilization in the streets of Hezbollah supporters. He also added that the party did not envisage, “in the near future”, the resignation of its two ministers from Nawaf Salam’s government. According to him, this decision aims to preserve “a thin thread” of communication and to show that Hezbollah “does not want a break or a total separation”. [16]
However, these calls cannot hide the persistent tensions in the country that could erupt in the future. The deputy chairman of Hezbollah’s political bureau, Comati, warned that “We continue to give them a chance and try to make them reconsider their mistake... If they persist in this path, as seems to be the case, and if they want to lead the country towards discord, destruction and instability, we know how to deal with it,” without elaborating. [17]
This political and sectarian tension in the country of course serves the interests of Israel, which has a long history of exploiting these tensions, and would not mind the outbreak of sectarian clashes.
Conclusion
Many Lebanese politicians mentioned that this framework agreement reminded them of the 17 May 1983 agreement, signed between the Lebanese government chaired by Amine Gemayel and Israel and supposed to officially end the state of belligerence between the two countries, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and above all to entrench Lebanon in the pro-US and Israeli camp. However, this agreement was never implemented and was cancelled in February 1984, when the Israeli occupation never ended.
But even more dangerously, the content of this framework agreement is in many ways reminiscent of the relationship that governs the genocidal Israeli state and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Following the Oslo Accords in 1993, the PA gradually acted as a form of police for the benefit of Washington and Tel Aviv. So instead of leading to Palestinian liberation, this agreement represented a real capitulation and endorsed Israeli colonialism in historic Palestine, while betraying the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their land. On the other hand, this has allowed the occupation authorities to maintain their control over the entire Occupied Palestinian Territories and to develop settlements. Moreover, Palestinian divisions are linked in particular to the consequences of the Oslo Accords and PA policies.
With each advance of Israeli expansionist colonial policies, supported by the United States and other Western powers, Tel Aviv deploys even more its murderous violence against the regional populations and extends its occupation of Lebanese and Syrian Palestinian territories, accompanied by policies of ethnic cleansing by transforming its territories into “no man’s land”. For example, shortly after the signing of the Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement, Tel Aviv intensified its attacks in southern Syria, specifically in Daraa province and the Yarmuk Basin, through incursion operations and expanding its occupation of Syrian territory. In Gaza, the genocide continues and the Israeli occupying forces have extended their occupation inside Palestinian territory, from 53% to 60% at the end of May, after the so-called truce reached in October 2025, while in the rest of the remaining territory, 90% of the inhabitants live in overcrowded and destitute IDP camps. On 28 May 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he had ordered the Israeli occupation army to take control of 70 percent of the enclave, while the next day, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said Israel was ready to set up three settlements in northern Gaza and should take over the rest of Gaza. All this is taking place with total impunity granted by the United States and the major Western powers.
In conclusion, neither in Lebanon, nor in Palestine, nor in Syria, nor in Iran, nor anywhere else, is the United States and its Israeli ally seeking democracy or the well-being of the local populations. Their goal is to impose mainly through violence a regional order dominated by Washington and Tel Aviv.
1 July 2026
Translated by International Viewpoint from Inprecor.
