In both countries the war falls hardest on the poor, but Ukrainian soldiers, unlike Russian ones, can organise, and a soldiers’ union, women veterans, LGBT+ servicemembers, nurses, students and socialists are contesting the debt, labour and family policies of the wartime state. Their programme of worker representation, taxation of war profits and accountable command confronts both the government’s neoliberal course and the far right’s ambitions.
In Russia, where the dead come disproportionately from poor regions and non-Slav nationalities, a victory would consolidate a regime that has staked its survival on the war.
Washington now treats Europe as secondary; the West European powers carry the financing, on terms that convert support into debt. European arms shareholders have multiplied their profits, while Ukraine borrows from EU states to buy EU weapons. Ukrainian refugees across Europe face benefit cuts, while Russians who refuse to fight find it harder and harder to emigrate.
Ukraine’s war of resistance has pushed it into an uneasy alliance with the Western powers, and for the first time since 1945 the West European states face a regional war without American leadership.
Washington’s priority is a deal: after talks in Oslo on 20 October and Steve Witkoff’s meeting with Putin in St Petersburg the next day, both sides agreed to resume trilateral negotiations, and Zelensky has repeated that he is open to freezing the current front line. [1]
What a freeze would hand over
Russia, a re-emerging imperialist power, is challenging the Western bloc and asserting an economic and military frontier across much of the former Soviet Union; in Ukraine that ambition takes the form of reconquest, and in the territories it holds, of a cultural genocide.
A freeze would leave the population of the occupied territories under the regime Russia has built there. Residents describe torture for a tattoo of the Ukrainian flag, or for talking Ukrainian, or playing Ukrainian music.[“ ‘When I dream about going back, I’m scared I might say something in Ukrainian’: how the most everyday things become perilous under occupation”, Ukrainska Pravda, 2 October 2026, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2026/10/02/8056053/]] More than 16,000 Ukrainian civilians remain in Russian detention. [2]
The Ukrainian language is disappearing. In the 2025–2026 school year, 1,980 schools in the occupied territories operated in Russian only, under Russian standards. [3] Cadet classes in Crimean schools rose from 12 in 2016–17 to 260 in 2024–25. Ukraine has verified 20,651 deportations or forced transfers of children, of whom only 2,644 had returned by September. [4]
Homes not re-registered under Russian law, which requires the owners to accept Russian citizenship, and if abroad to return through Russia, are declared "ownerless" and redistributed by the municipality to Russian settlers. [5]
Of the 322 people facing politically motivated prosecution in Crimea in October, 171 were Crimean Tatars, a people deported wholesale in 1944. Krymska Solidarnist (Crimean Solidarity), which documented their trials for a decade, closed after being declared a "foreign agent" in June. [6] Fewer than a dozen Crimean political prisoners have returned to Ukraine through exchanges since 2014. [7]
Freezing the front line would also strengthen the Russian army. UN monitors already document the forced mobilisation of men in the occupied territories. [8] A settlement that ceded territory would extend that recruitment pool, and a Ukrainian capitulation would place the men of a whole country at the disposal of the Russian army. The most obscene statistic of the Russian occupation: at least 95% of released Ukrainian prisoners of war report torture. [9]
A military success that leaves Ukraine more exposed
Ukrainian counter-attacks in 2026 have virtually halted Russian advances, with a net Russian loss of 122 km² between 1 September and 16 October. [10] Ukrainian drones hit a Russian refinery on average once every three days in the first eight months of the year, and by the end of August half of Russia’s refining capacity was offline and refined-product exports had halved. [11] This drone capacity was built from below: defence production grew 35-fold between 2022 and 2025, domestic manufacturers took 76% of state procurement, and more than 160 companies, including a few linked to the anarchist Solidarity Collectives, can produce over 8 million FPV drones a year, as I set out in an analysis of Ukraine’s defence economy.
Russia’s military answer to the Ukrainian drone offensive targeting oil refineries increasingly targets civilian life. The fifth Russian winter campaign against Ukrainian civil power and heating opened on 30 September; [12]
According to the UN, 2,570 civilians were killed and 15,211 injured in Ukraine between January and September 2026, 59% more than a year earlier, mostly by missiles and long-range drones. [13]. Ukrainian-caused civilian deaths in Russia are very low, mostly deaths from Ukrainian drones in the Belgorod region, six in one attack in August. [14] The UN has no mandate to verify casualties inside Russia, just as it has no access to Ukrainian POWs in Russia.
Ukraine’s success has increased tensions with its allies. Washington punished the refinery campaign: in October it eased sanctions on Russian diesel to lower fuel prices before the midterm elections and threatened to cut intelligence sharing and the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), through which European states buy US weapons for Ukraine, unless Kyiv stopped. [15] This last threat is weak – the US has used so many of its advanced weapon stock in Iran that it no longer exports even to its NATO allies and other key buyers like Saudi Arabia.
By mid-October Ukraine’s interceptor stocks were almost exhausted. [16] European arms groups want western arms supply to Ukraine to pass through them, and they want to absorb the most efficient parts of the Ukraine drone and armaments industry, as Jean Batou and I showed in "Europe as a Great Power is not Ukraine’s Friend".
In Kyiv, control of the defence economy is what the July crisis was about.
Who fights, who pays, who can organise
Both states load the war onto their poorest citizens: in Ukraine, men under 25 are not mobilised, "critical" enterprises can reserve their staff, and an exemption can be bought for around USD 10,000 (EUR 8,670). "Busification", men seized in the street and driven to recruitment centres, falls on those without money, connections or a protected employer, while enforcement is otherwise weak. The Prosecutor General has classified the figures, but parliamentarians regularly refer to anywhere between 200,000 and 500,000 draft evaders. [17]
In Russia, army recruits and deaths come overwhelmingly from the poor regions and the non-Slav nationalities. A Muscovite is about 25 times less likely to die than a resident of Tuva or Chukotka. [18] Ethnic Buryats are 2.3% of Russia’s war dead but 0.34% of its population. The army is refilled by bonuses and coercion: regional governments’ enlistment bonuses rose by about 30% this year. The analyst Janis Kluge estimates about 93,000 men volunteered (contract soldiers) in the second quarter of 2026, though the rights project Idite Lesom (Get Lost) identified some cases of men detained in the street and pressured to sign contracts. [19]
Recruitment of prisoners is emptying Russian prisons, despite the incarceration of war refusers and political opponents of the Putin regime. The prison population fell from 465,000 at the end of 2021 to about 282,000 in May this year, a drop of nearly 40%. [20] Feminist Anti-War Resistance’s 2026 report records more than 1,000 women victims of violent crimes by servicemen in a year, perpetrators returning to the front unpunished, and women in the republics taking on work their communities assign to men. [21]
There is a tremendous political difference in how solidiers can organise to protect their rights. Russian commanders are regularly accused of executing their own men or sending “troublemakers” unsupported into assaults. [22] This means that a Russian soldier who refuses his conditions can only desert, and the routes out are closing. Idite Lesom’s founder, Grigory Sverdlin, says that a significant number of those it helps choose to hide inside Russia, while most of those it gets out end up in Kazakhstan or Armenia, "because those are countries where you can legally live with a Russian internal passport (ID card)"; he guesses that "around 90% of them now live in those two countries." [23] But the doors are closing. Kazakhstan has granted refugee status to no Russian since 2022 and in January started sending suspected deserters (though not yet draft-dodgers) back to Russia. [24] For all their talk about human rights, the EU countries are little better. Finland’s land border has been closed since December 2023 and its "pushback law", which allows the reception of asylum applications to be refused there, is to be extended to 2028; Since January this year, Estonia bans all who ever fought for Russia, deserters included. Germany rejects asylum claims by Russian deserters, with the manifestly false argument that they face only a fine at home. [25]
Ukrainian soldiers also face unaccountable officers, inadequate supplies because of corruption, and in many cases a lack of leave and rotation away from front line positions. But unlike those fighting for Russia, Ukrainian soldiers protest publicly and are building their own organisations. In June the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Ukraine (KVPU) brought the All-Ukrainian Union of Combatants, Military Personnel and Veterans into its ranks; KVPU president Mykhailo Volynets said soldiers "must not only enjoy society’s respect, but also have effective mechanisms to influence state policy and defend their civil rights." Veteranka won Bill 13037, obliging commanders to investigate discrimination and harassment; its head, Kateryna Pryimak, says "the army is the group in society with the fewest rights, and women in the army face the greatest restrictions." LGBT Military for Equal Rights, with more than 700 openly serving members, demands the civil partnerships parliament refuses, and soldiers’ families have campaigned since October 2023 for defined terms of service. These are the democratic infrastructure of the resistance.
The rear as a battleground
Ukraine’s wartime state has a neoliberal programme, and its creditors help to write it. As I explained in "Who Pays for Ukraine?", Ukraine’s own tax revenues cover only defence; debt servicing consumed 42% of domestic revenue in 2025, and the EU, holder of 44% of the external debt, attaches 325 conditions and 531 monitoring indicators to its money. War bonds paying up to 16.5% are bought by the oligarchs’ banks, and microloan debt stood at UAH 25.15 billion (EUR 494 million) at the end of 2025. The draft 2027 budget allocates almost UAH 4.89 trillion (EUR 96 billion) to security and defence and needs USD 52.6 billion (EUR 45.6 billion) of external finance. [26] The economist Yuliya Yurchenko warned in 2023 that any future government, "even if the most well-meaning people come to power", would be "in the straitjacket of that conditionality". [27] Parliament can refuse individual conditions, as it did in September when the Verkhovna Rada rejected two bills on which a USD 700 million (EUR 607 million) IMF tranche and a EUR 3.7 billion EU macro-financial payment depended, but each refusal holds up money the budget cannot do without. [28]
To reinforce the neoliberal straightjacket, Labour and family law are increasingly reactionary. The draft Labour Code reintroduced on 2 September as bill No. 16010 is based on an earlier draft in which Vitaliy Dudin of Sotsialnyi Rukh (Social Movement) showed that the provisions favourable to workers had been removed before it reached parliament. [29] The same parliament approved at first reading, by 254 votes to 2, a Civil Code defining the family as "the cohabitation of a man and a woman". [30] The same code makes "good morals", a term it uses 45 times, a ground for judicial rulings, which Human Rights Watch warns opens the way to "arbitrary interpretation", and its Article 328 would let anyone demand the deletion of public information about themselves once it has "lost public interest", a provision critics see as a weapon against investigative journalism. [31] Kyiv protesters also challenged its property provisions with placards asking: "Is stealing land also a virtue?" [32] Deregulated labour, debt-financed social provision and a draft Civil Code that narrows the legal family, licenses moral judgement by the courts and shields the powerful from scrutiny together make up the programme for a ‘new Ukraine’ that the Ukrainan government expects the population to resist and die for.
From April to June protests against the Civil Code spread to at least eight cities; "this civil code is a disgrace, it should be withdrawn or stopped," the veteran Viktor Pylypenko told the Kyiv rally. [33] Sotsialnyi Rukh, the Pryama Diia (Direct Action) student union and the Pasyazhery Kyiva (Kyiv Passengers) group fought a near-fourfold rise in Kyiv transport fares and won a civic council demand for its reversal. In July the Security Service and police charged Maksym Shumakov, head of Pryama Diia at Lviv University, with distributing communist symbols, which he links to the union’s campaigns. [34] The Be Like Us nurses’ movement denounced shortages, emigration and pay that lags behind workload. [35]
The July crisis set a "drone liberal" fraction, seeking integration with Western arms industry on Ukrainian terms and a low-tax export model, against a procurement clique embedded in the command and the presidential circle. Taras Bilous, historian and serving soldier, welcomed the removal of Defence Minister Syrskyi, who "micromanaged the front lines, and whose decisions led to unnecessarily high losses" (Klassekampen), while calling Fedorov’s contract system unfair: "The discharge and deferral conditions are unfair to those who have already been serving for more than a year" (Solidaritet). Dudin warned that modernisation must not become "yet another excuse for neoliberal restructuring of the state", and that innovation must "not enrich a new generation of oligarchs or foreign investors" (The future of Ukraine is the issue). Sotsialnyi Rukh demands worker representation on the boards of strategic enterprises and confiscation of oligarch assets. The elements of an answer already exist in the soldiers’ own organisations: Veteranka’s law obliging commanders to investigate abuses, the KVPU’s demand for "effective mechanisms to influence state policy", and the families’ campaign for defined terms of service.
Russia: a regime that cannot stop
Russia’s war economy is running down: the Bank of Finland’s research institute puts growth at around 1% this year and ½% next; the 2026 federal deficit has been revised to a record RUB 7.345 trillion (EUR 76 billion), and several government bond auctions have failed. [36] Wage arrears reached RUB 2.88 billion (EUR 35 million) in April, the highest since 2019; arrears caused by late state payments rose 62-fold, and state media were advised to ignore the figures. [37]
Ilya Budraitskis and Ilya Matveev’s Russia’s New Imperialism: Capital and Ideology offers the most developed left account of where this leads. They define imperialism as "a systemic policy of coercion in international relations under conditions of highly asymmetrical power distribution" and place Russian capital as subimperial: dominant over parts of the former Soviet Union but "a regional node in the globalized accumulation process", dependent on Western centres. Economic interest alone, they argue, does not explain an invasion that offered little gain. After Maidan the Kremlin treated popular mobilisation as a Western weapon and fused regime survival with national security; the decisive turn came in 2014, and ideology drove the escalation of 2022. The war has since remade economy and polity alike: decoupling from the West, an economy organised around the war, near-full employment and criminalised dissent. They also identify the fragilities: persistent inflation, strained public finances and dissatisfied ultra-nationalists.
And yet, "the Kremlin has far outpaced the majority of Russian society in its imperial-nationalist radicalization." Public opinion is cynical and passive, held by material incentives and coercion, while "the groundwork is being laid to indoctrinate a new generation of Russian youth". Russia’s future is not "preordained". [38]
There are, of course, economic interests: Ukraine’s metallurgy, grain, Black Sea ports and gas-transit routes, and a regional market that Russian capital can dominate as its access to Western markets narrows, are the material stakes of the frontier Russia is asserting across the former Soviet Union.
Those dynamics explain why the outcome of the war matters inside Russia. Before it was dissolved as a ‘foreign agent’ The Russian Socialist Movement (RSD) wrote in 2024 that the regime "can no longer exit the state of war", that a deal on the Kremlin’s terms "will not change Putinism’s essential attitude towards war", and that defeat "would be tantamount to its collapse". [39] A victory would consolidate the regime; anything less would expose the gap Budraitskis and Matveev describe.
The regime answers with repression: 284 people were convicted of treason or espionage in the first half of 2026, more than in all pre-war years since 1997. The human rights group OVD-Info was declared "extremist" in June. [40] Independent analysts put real turnout in September’s Duma election at about 40%, against the official 59.8%, and on 5 October a Moscow rally of the otherwise patriotic Communist Party turned into chants of "Down with the Tsar!" and "Freedom for political prisoners!", with some 60 arrests. [41]
Europe without America
The January 2026 US National Defense Strategy prioritises homeland defence and deterrence of China. Europe is suddenly much less important to US policy makers. [42] The Pentagon announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany, began a review of its European presence on 28 July and in September was weighing cuts of 25,000 to 50,000. [43]
The West European powers now carry the financing of the Ukrainian resistance,and set its terms. Much of what they count as support never reaches Ukraine. The EU lends Ukraine money to buy the weapons it once donated; through PURL, the US arms industry is paid without carrying any credit risk (Who Pays for Ukraine?), and European donors bought at least EUR 3 billion of weapons from US companies in the first half of 2026. [44] Of the EUR 100 billion Germany reports as bilateral aid, only EUR 41.7 billion actually went to Ukraine, with EUR 35.9 billion spent inside Germany, mostly on refugees, and EUR 22 billion to cover future commitments. [45] In Prague, Andrej Babiš kept the Czech ammunition initiative running but ended Czech state funding for it, leaving other donors to pay for shells supplied mostly by the country’s big arms capital, above all Michal Strnad’s Czechoslovak Group (CSG). [46] Europe’s biggest weapons manufacturer Rheinmetall’s share price multiplied by 18 between the end of 2021 and the end of 2025, yet neither Ukraine nor any other European government has proposed a windfall tax on arms manufacturers.
If it is not conquered by Russia, Ukraine will be integrated into the European Union, but without a vote. At least, that’s what German Chancellor Merz proposed in May this year (Europe as a Great Power is not Ukraine’s Friend). Hungary blocked two accession chapter negotiations on 27 October. [47]
Germany counts its spending on refugees as aid to Ukraine while cutting what refugees receive. As Batou and I have documented, more than four million Ukrainians live under temporary protection that expires on 4 March 2027; Germany pays post-April 2025 arrivals asylum-seeker rates, the Czech Republic cuts benefits by a third for those not employed within 150 days, while nearly 60% of employed refugees work below their skills. The differential treatment of Ukrainians should have been the basis for extending equal protection to Palestinians and others fleeing war; instead it has been used to level protection down. Russian deserters, whose refusal weakens the invading army, are met with entry bans.
Solidarity from below
A Russian victory would produce a reactionary shock in West European capitals and a militarisation beside which the present programme would look modest. As Bilous puts it: "it’s certainly a problem that Western elites are taking advantage of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to increase defence spending. And yet, a Russian victory could lead to an even greater arms race." [48] The left’s demands follow: no to western Europe’s own rearmament, military support to Ukraine without conditions on Ukraine’s economic and social policy, grants instead of loans, windfall taxes on war profits in western Europe and in Ukraine, cancellation of Ukraine’s debt, and protection for every Ukrainian refugee and every Russian deserter or draft-dodger.
Solidarity from below already reaches several of these struggles. Against the debt, the campaign for cancellation launched by Ukrainian citizens with Sotsialnyi Rukh and supported by the Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt (CADTM) asks why Ukrainians should repay loans for their own defence.
For those who refuse to fight, Idite Lesom helps Russians desert, and in Finland, the Helsinki branch of the Left Alliance’s youth organisation and Sitoutumaton Vasemmisto (Independent Left) joined the 19 September demonstration demanding an end to deportations of Russian war resisters and draft evaders for the duration of the war. [49]
The International Solidarity Convoy to Ukraine, launched by the International Network for Solidarity with Ukraine (INSU) [50] with the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine (FPU), UGT de Catalunya and NOVACT, sets out on 20–21 November on three routes converging on Kyiv, with a target of EUR 100,000 for generators and stoves. [51] Alfons Bech, who organises its southern route, describes in the interview published alongside this article the obstacle it faces: a "neutrality" towards Russian imperialism in much of the European left and trade-union movement. "It is a neutrality that closely recalls the one the ’democracies’ adopted towards fascism," he says; "standing aside is helping the aggressor." [52]
A freeze on the current line, debt that binds any future Ukrainian government, and borders closed to those who refuse to fight for Putin are parts of a settlement that works for the US and Russian elites, and part of the European ruling class. Each part weakens the forces that could change the outcome: the Ukrainians resisting occupation, the soldiers and workers organising in the rear, and the Russians whose refusal exposes a regime that has staked its survival on the war. The response must be solidarity that arms Ukraine, cancels its debt and opens the borders to Russians who refuse to fight.
6 November 2026

