Version imprimableThe hardening of the Erdogan regime , which crosses an unprecedented red line with this arrest, collides with the information from recent months on a peace process initiated with the Kurdish national movement of Turkey, in particular the central political-military organization within this movement: the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). It is a question of understanding this context with two seemingly contradictory dynamics in order to grasp the potential and pitfalls that this ongoing movement faces, the consequences of which it would be very risky to predict at the time this article is written.
From one election to another
It is important to remember one fundamental fact: elections in Turkey have so far been competitive and attract very strong civic participation from a highly politicized society. I have already mentioned a "minimal but solid democratic culture" among the Turkish population of Turkey. It is true that this has not prevented the majority of the population from remaining generally passive about the deeply unequal conditions of an election, not only in socio-economic terms, as in any liberal democracy, but, above all, in terms of direct and indirect repression against opposition forces, especially if it affects a Kurdish minority experiencing colonial oppression.
This population has thus accepted (without necessarily approving it but by letting it happen) that the results of the last two local elections in Kurdish localities have been, for the most part, annulled and that, in a purely colonial logic, the regularly elected mayors have been imprisoned and replaced by administrators appointed by the government. But this culture also leads to granting crucial importance to competitive elections as a "justice of the peace" to determine the direction of the state and to heavily investing in these issues. Proof of this is that the participation rate in an election has never fallen below 76 per cent (a figure that is not subject to fraud, voter mobilization being systematically observable) and has regularly been above 85 per cent for 45 years.
After the resounding failure of the 2023 general elections, which saw the re-election of Erdoğan and a weakened but renewed majority, the CHP decided to hold a congress... with at its head, Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu who, faithful to the tradition of his party’s leaders not to accept any failure, was preparing to be re-elected president of the party. However, the shock of the failure, the calamitous management of the period between the general elections and the congress [1] caused him to lose a large part of his political credibility. This resulted in an unprecedented electroshock within the CHP, with the formation of an opposition of "renovators" grouped around the mayor of Istanbul elected in 2019, Ekrem Imamoğlu, and his ally, the chairman of the parliamentary group, Özgür Ozel.
In November 2023, for the first time in a century of the party’s existence, an incumbent party president was defeated at a congress and the CHP was taken over by the duo of Özel, as president, and Imamoglu, the main public figure. What changes has this new leadership of "renovators", coming nonetheless from the apparatus, implemented ? Essentially, two things. On the one hand, greater professionalism in the leadership of the party, and the shaking up of a heavy apparatus with 1.5 million members. On the other, a more explicit opening towards the Kurds of Turkey. The new leadership refuses to ostracize the DEM (People’s Equality and Democracy Party, born from the Kurdish national movement and democrats), and Imamoglu considered, for example, during a public debate that it would be "madness" to consider a party receiving 5 million votes as "terrorist”. [2]
It was with this renewed team that the CHP approached the 2024 local elections, which Erdoğan had pledged to win on the very evening of his re-election, particularly aiming to recapture Istanbul. Opposition analysts did not approach this election with much hope, the main focus being on preserving the gains of 2019. The surprise was the opposite of that of 2023 : a huge snub for the regime and a resounding success for the CHP, symbolically taking the lead in the poll.
For his part, Ekrem Imamoğlu easily outstripped his AKP opponent and secured a large majority in the municipal council (which he had not previously enjoyed). The momentum of the CHP apparatus combined with the end of the regime’s countercyclical measures in favour of a classic austerity policy and, to a certain extent, with the exposure of the regime’s hypocrisy on the Palestinian question, with business circles close to the government trading with Israel (and even its army).
The situation thus seems to have become clearer over the past year: the CHP is the country’s main political force and, in Imamoğlu has a popular candidate capable of defeating Erdogan. This poses an immense danger for a regime whose leaders derive considerable personal benefits from their hold on political power.
A peace process?
It is in this context that the "peace process" comes into play. It has taken an unexpected form: it is Devlet Bahçeli, the old leader of the ultranationalist MHP allied with Erdogan, who put forward the proposal for a process leading to the disarmament and dissolution of the PKK in exchange for an amnesty including the historic leader, founder and emblematic figure, Abdullah Öcalan, detained on the island prison of Imrali for 26 years.
A process of exchanges and negotiations thus began, including meetings between government officials and a delegation of DEM MPs acting as intermediaries with Imrali and Mount Qandil in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the PKK leadership is located. This culminated in Abdullah Öcalan’s "historic" declaration of February 27, 2025, calling for the PKK to lay down its arms and self-dissolve.
Three weeks later, the Erdogan regime decided to cross a line that had never been crossed before: preventing an opponent from running in the presidential election. This first resulted in the cancellation of Imamoğlu’s degree, decades after he had received it, even though, according to the Turkish constitution, a university degree is a prerequisite for running in the presidential election.
This decision was immediately followed by his arrest, along with that of a large part of his general staff, for corruption and support for terrorism (classic accusations of the regime against its adversaries). The timing of this operation was not due to chance: scalded by the catastrophic sequence of presidential candidate selection during the 2023 election, the CHP held its primary on Sunday, March 23 to designate its candidate for the next election, with the only candidate being Ekrem Imamoğlu.
How can we understand the concomitance between this "peace process" and this authoritarian offensive targeting a Turkish centre-left party? It is possible to make a hypothesis and an observation about the reality of this "peace process."
The hypothesis would be that, faced with the greater than ever risk of losing power to the CHP, the regime decided to criminalize it, counting on divisions that would arise within it on this occasion. However, since the operation is on such a large scale (it concerns the party ruling the largest cities in the country), it could involve separately resolving the other major issue – the “Kurdish question” – in the expectation that the Kurdish national movement would remain neutral in the face of the criminalization of the CHP and would prioritize the “peace process.” However, assuming that this is indeed the large-scale manoeuvre initiated by the regime, it could only encounter several major obstacles, the first being the very situation of the “peace process.”
Indeed, Öcalan’s spectacular statement was widely commented on in the international press, but omitting a detail that is not really one: after reading Öcalan’s text at a press conference, the delegation of DEM MPs added orally: "A. Abdullah Öcalan then told us : ’ Without a doubt, the disarmament and self-dissolution of the PKK will require in practice the recognition of civil politics and a legal dimension.’" This "footnote," considered as part of Öcalan’s statement by the entire Kurdish national movement, obviously changes the situation since it is no longer a question of unilateral self-dissolution but of an option conditioned by counterparts, namely tangible democratic guarantees.
But this is where the problem lies: there has been absolutely no positive political gesture towards the Kurds since the beginning of this "process". Not a single Kurdish locality placed under guardianship has found its legitimate mayor, no mayor imprisoned during the last two mandates and no political leader of the DEM (and its predecessor the HDP) has been released... When Ekrem Imamoğlu is arrested, there is certainly a "peace process" underway, but without the slightest concrete progress on the part of the Turkish government.
That makes all the more astonishing. Bahçeli Devlet ’s statement of March 21, in which the ultranationalist leader proposes that a congress of self-dissolution of the PKK be held on May 5, on the territory of the Turkish state, in Malazgirt with the logistical assistance of the DEM mayor of the locality! It is difficult to imagine the PKK General Staff coming from Mount Qandil in a little over a month without the slightest guarantee of any kind (neither political nor otherwise) and laying down their arms to leave with their hands in their pockets... Especially since the other part of this statement by Bahçeli is a very violent attack against the CHP (of which the MHP was an ally 10 years ago... before allying with the AKP) criminalizing the Turkish centre-left party with formulations that hardly allow the possibility of a democratic evolution to transpire.
However, Kurdish leaders (whether civilian politicians with the DEM, the PKK’s political-military apparatus, or the associative fabric of this galaxy) are not unaware that this lack of democratization makes any peace process more than precarious. They cannot fail to remember that in 2015 the previous peace process was suddenly thrown in the dustbin by Erdogan, who even denied its existence afterwards. Basically, the legitimate mistrust of the DEM leaders was summed up by its co-president Tülay Hatimogullari : "Who says that tomorrow we will not be prosecuted because of our meetings with Öcalan as part of the delegation for the peace process?"
Erdogan’s failure
Consequently, since the beginning of this crisis, DEM has maintained a principled position of defending the peace process and democratic rights as a whole, far from the stereotypical and baseless accusations made by nationalist opposition circles that it is a question of giving Erdogan a free hand in exchange for peace. DEM’s leadership supported Imamoğlu during the cancellation of his diploma and subsequent arrest, and also met with the CHP leadership at Istanbul City Hall, which has become a rallying point for the opposition. The party’s Istanbul branch called for people to go to Saraçhane Square, where Istanbul City Hall is located and where huge rallies have been taking place since Imamoğlu ’s arrest .
Even more symbolic were the Newroz festivities, a holiday traditionally celebrated by the Kurds and an annual gathering of the Kurdish national movement for mass meetings. The Newroz celebration in Amed /Diyarbakir is considered a very important political moment. However, contrary to expectations, there was no new message from Abdullah Öcalan read from the podium, as the DEM delegation was prevented from meeting him, which is a definite setback for the peace process.
The speech of Tuncer Bakırhan , co-chair of DEM, was highly anticipated and he targeted the regime by declaring: "What is being done to the opposition is contrary to the spirit of the February 27 statement (by Abdullah Öcalan, Ed.) and is unacceptable" after having explicitly denounced the imprisonment of Imamoğlu. All this is in line with DEM’s position from the beginning but it is likely that the regime was hoping for a more "neutral" statement.
Thus, the regime’s divisive manoeuvre seems to have already failed, largely due to the lucidity of the DEM leaders. It should be noted, however, that the CHP leaders also sought to rise to the occasion by not leaving the hand extended by the DEM leaders hanging in the air. Özgür Özel also sent a statement for Newroz (a first for a CHP chairman):
" (…) These lands are ancient lands where different cultures, languages and beliefs live together in brotherhood, where solidarity and hope flourish. No tyrant, no Dehak [3] will be able to break our brotherhood!" He concluded his text with the traditional formula in Kurdish. "Newroz piroz be!”
He later greeted a large number of political prisoners, including former leaders of the HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party, predecessor of the DEM). Similarly, in a statement written in detention and published on social media, Ekrem Imamoğlu said: "As long as the Kurds say there is a problem, then there is a Kurdish problem."
Mobilized youth and CHP
Similarly, since the beginning of the movement, the CHP has sought to establish a link with the mobilized society, unlike what happened during the last democratic mass movement that Turkey experienced in 2013 (the so-called Gezi movement ). In addition to an open discourse towards the Kurds, its leadership formally recognized the importance of students in this mobilization by offering them a platform in Saraçhane Square.
Indeed, student youth constitute the vanguard of the movement and this is recognized by all actors, whether it is the CHP or the personalities, artists , athletes, media celebrities who all refer to the importance of the country’s youth in their declarations of indirect or explicit support for the movement. But this is also "recognized" by the regime since the repression falls primarily on them. For example, at the time of writing, Selinay Uzuntel, a student leader who spoke in Saraçhane Square on behalf of the struggling students (and also a member of the EMEP, the Marxist-Leninist Workers’ Party, with Hoxhaist tendencies) has just been arrested along with other student leaders .
There are 7 million students in Turkey, representing 8.2 per cent of the total population (compared to 4.4 per cent in France). These young people have only known the AKP in power, in its corrupt and nepotistic version. They study but cannot hope to find a career path in most cases. Faced with the arbitrary power structure, the vast majority would like to live abroad if they could. They witness daily the immense gap between the virtues advocated by the regime and the ostentatious and arrogant cynicism of those who benefit from it.
Some remember the older brothers and sisters who "made Gezi," confronted with arbitrary and intrusive authorities... Twelve years ago, a young comrade told me during the Gezi movement : "Being young in Turkey means being yelled at by Erdogan on television every morning and night ." This striking phrase is certainly even more true today, even as the regime loses more of its legitimacy every day.
This vanguard role of student mobilization goes hand in hand with a desire for autonomy. Thus, for the first time in Istanbul, on Monday, March 24, there was a separate rally called by struggling students in Besiktas, not Saraçhane . Earlier in the day, "academic boycotts" (the equivalent of "student strikes") were launched at many universities.
Returning to the CHP, it successfully conducted its primary, but opened it up to all citizens who were able to participate in "solidarity" votes. On Sunday evening, the CHP leadership announced the colossal figure of 15 million people who went to the polls (the vote was not electronic) for a primary that became a plebiscite. It is impossible to have confirmation of this figure since it was an exercise and no media outlet with sufficient resources was authorized by the regime to cover this event.
Nevertheless, local press coverage indicates that participation was strong. While the weakness of the labour movement, difficult living standards, and obstacles to organization make a massive strike seem out of reach, the CHP has called for a boycott of certain economic groups and media outlets. Since the beginning of the movement, the regime has spent 11 per cent of its foreign currency reserves ($20 billion) to prevent a collapse of the Turkish lira, while the Istanbul stock market has recovered after an initial collapse.
Saraçhane rallies are colossal, but will they be able to maintain this pace if there is no progress?
Neighbourhood assemblies have already been set up in Istanbul, if only because Saraçhane is far for millions of residents of tis vast metropolis. It is impossible to predict the future of the current movement, but it is possible to address some of the contradictions within it.
Kemalism versus Kemalism ?
From this polyphony proclaiming its aspiration for the unity of the people beyond its traditional divisions and its relations of oppression, however, rises a dissonance which does not cover the other sounds but cannot be ignored either: that of Turkish supremacism. Although there are other ultranationalist soloists in opposition to Erdogan (the leaders of the Iyi, the "Good Party", or the neo-fascists of the ZP, the Victory Party), the most strident sound is produced by the CHP mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavaş.
A former ultranationalist leader who joined the CHP, he won the Ankara mayoralty in 2019, at the same time as Imamoğlu won in Istanbul, then confirmed his victory by crushing his AKP opponent in 2024. During his speech in Saraçhane , he denounced a "double standard" against the demonstrators in Istanbul while a "party in the East of the country" organizes rallies (Newroz in which a "rag" (Kurdish and PKK flags) is waved and where cotton candy is offered to young people (in reference to a widely circulated video of a police officer distributing this candy to children in a Kurdish locality on the occasion of Newroz) while "here" (in Istanbul or Ankara but in subtext the "Turks") "young people are being beaten up".
This crude discourse equates a micro-event with decades of colonial oppression and reverses historical roles. Insensitive to any prospect of peace, it wants to maintain the supremacist status quo, that is, democracy only for Turks, and therefore ultimately no democracy for anyone. This discourse is not that of the movement’s leadership, especially since Yavaş, as a defector from another party, has never had powerful relays in the CHP (which was capable of having this kind of discourse in its worst right-wing periods), but it exists.
Behind Yavas stands the nationalist opposition milieu of the small parties mentioned above, but also some other mayors, such as Tanju Özcan in Bolu, or Burcu Köksal in Afyonkarahisar, as well as and CHP cadres. They not only represent a risk of deviation for the movement, they weaken it. It is because of Yavaş ’s speech that Özgür Özel was booed during her intervention at the Newroz in Istanbul. As a shrewd politician, Erdogan did not fail to denounce Yavaş ’s remarks to present the current movement as that of the enemies of peace and the supporters of the status quo [4].
Any observer of the current movement will notice the portraits of Mustafa Kemal accompanied by Turkish flags that abound at rallies and demonstrations. The same was true in 2013 for the Gezi movement . Even among the youth, the mobilization is justified by some students and by a large number of those who support them by mobilizing the figure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with many extracts from his "Speech to Youth", or from his formula from his "Great Speech" entrusting the Republic to the youth or even by the more generic formula "sovereignty belongs without condition or restriction to the nation" (as opposed to a single individual, Erdogan).
The use of the tutelary figure of the founder of the Republic of Turkey legitimises an oppositional discourse, situates it in a patriotic continuity while mobilising it for something else. What is retained from the argument is what can be linked to a collective sovereignty, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the historical mission of Turkish youth, thus validating the discourse carried today concretely by this youth. Thus, just as during the Gezi movement, but even more explicitly since it is a question of opposing an operation explicitly calling into question an electoral process (whose importance in Turkey was previously recalled), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is mobilised for a democratic aspiration. [5].
This is, at bottom, a form of performative discourse in relation to the past: if Mustafa Kemal entrusts the Republic to the youth, it is because this Republic and the gesture of the war of liberation carry within them our democratic aspiration. Özgür Özel does not proceed any differently when he proclaims "These lands are ancient lands where different cultures, languages and beliefs live together in brotherhood", while these lands have experienced the Armenian genocide, the wealth tax law [6], even before the colonial oppression of the Kurds. But, since the objective now stated is an inclusive republic, it is appropriate to reinvent a past that corresponds to it and a fidelity to Kemalism that validates the political aspirations of the day.
In the face of this, Mansur Yavaş lies about today’s social relations by presenting the Kurds as privileged compared to the Turks oppressed in their own country. But he is faithful to the practical content of real Kemalism, the product of a war of national liberation, which was heroic while refusing to recognize Turkey’s national plurality, forgetting the promises made in this regard, repressing the Kurdish revolts and quickly putting an end to any form of controlled political pluralism...
There is, however, little doubt that for the radical left organisations involved in the mobilisation – and some of them are playing a role of catalyst among the youth, such as the TIP (Turkish Workers’ Party, which has four members of parliament, one of whom is in prison) – the priority is not to give a history lesson but to push the movement forward in concrete terms, since "every step forward in the real movement is worth more than a dozen programmes" (as Marx said), or a dozen history lessons...
The function of the lie of the mass democratic movement is to pave the way for confronting historical truth in order to deepen democracy and, as a class struggle strategy, remove divisive weapons from the hands of the bourgeoisie. But we are still far from that. Today, every step taken by a student demonstrating for respect for democracy in the conservative stronghold of Konya is more precious than these considerations. Our support must not fail them.
Contretemps. March 22, 2025.
