A previous failed attempt
The last significant attempt at negotiation dates back to the 2013-2015 peace process, which focused on several key issues aimed at ending the armed conflict and establishing a political solution to the Kurdish question in order to expand the AKP’s hegemony among the Kurdish electorate. It was about negotiating a lasting ceasefire and the withdrawal of the PKK armed forces from Turkey’s borders. This included discussions on the gradual disarmament of Kurdish fighters. But it also included democratic gains such as the recognition of cultural and linguistic rights, constitutional reforms, partial democratization and empowerment of local administration, the release of political prisoners, etc.
The project was aborted for internal and external reasons, deeply linked to the historical colonization of Kurdistan, divided between four states. On the one hand, the consolidation of the autonomous administration in the north-east of Syria, in Rojava, by the Syrian Kurds, under the leadership of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed branch, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) was already perceived by Ankara as a threat. The Turkish regime tried to stop this consolidation through its support for DAESH, notably during the siege of the city of Kobane in Syrian Kurdistan by the jihadist organization. This led to massive riots among the Kurdish people on the Turkish side of the border, in early October 2014.
On the other hand Selahattin Demirtaş , the leader of the HDP, the legal party of the Kurdish movement, led an effective campaign during the legislative elections of June 2015, bringing together a significant part of the left against Erdogan’s rise to the post of president. The HDP obtained an unexpected result of 13.1 per cent, entered parliament and prevented the AKP (Erdogan’s party) from forming a government on its own. This is how what we called at the time, the descent into hell began. Attacks, repression, massacres and the resumption of war... The turning point of 2015 was decisive in the change in the very nature of the Erdogan regime, which now allied itself with the historic party of the Turkish fascist far right, the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and remilitarized the Kurdish question.
Brutal repression and export of conflict
Thus, since 2015, arbitrariness and criminalization have been part of the political "rules of the game". The attempted coup d’état in 2016 by its former ally (the Gülen brotherhood ) allowed the regime to further strengthen its autocratic and repressive character, particularly against the Kurdish movement. More than ten thousand activists from the legal party have been behind bars for several years. The main civilian figures of the movement, its former presidents, spokespersons, leaders, deputies are also imprisoned and are serving sentences of several decades. In the aftermath of each regional/municipal election, almost all mayors of municipalities in the Kurdish region are dismissed from their positions on charges of links to terrorism (a large proportion are convicted) and replaced by administrators appointed by the state. Thus, the political choices of the Kurds, even in the absence of fraud on the part of the regime, are not respected, and their elected representatives (often elected with more than 70-80 per cent of the votes) are detained.
We should also add that the same procedure has begun to be applied to the town halls held by the CHP, the main opposition party (centre-left, republican) in recent months. At the time of writing, the mayor of the Beşiktaş district in Istanbul (one of the bastions of the secular opposition) has been arrested, formally on charges of corruption, but the real motive remains indisputably political.
So although the Kurdish people continue to fight, to express their identity, the movement itself has been enormously weakened in recent years. As for the armed branch, its leadership is still in place in the mountains of northern Iraq and is subject to attacks (with intensive use of drones, on both sides) from the Turkish army. But its troops have almost completely withdrawn from Turkish territory to join the YPG in Rojava (officially, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria).
Thus the Kurdish question, or more precisely the conflict with the Kurdish movement, has been in a certain fashion exported to neighbouring countries, Iraq and Syria, where the Turkish state continues in various ways, diplomatic, economic and military, to try to put an end to the presence of the pro-Öcalan Kurdish movement and of course to the autonomous administration that it leads.
Internal power relations
However, despite its authoritarian fashion of governing and a loss of public interest in politics, Erdogan’s AKP-MHP bloc suffered one of the worst setbacks in its history in the March 2024 municipal elections. Thus, with a lower turnout than in previous elections, the CHP won an unexpected victory, getting 37.8 per cent of the vote, as against 35.5 per cent for Erdogan’s party, the AKP. This was Erdogan’s first defeat since 2002. The CHP also managed to win city halls in real AKP strongholds, but more importantly, Istanbul and Ankara remained in the hands of the opposition. Among the factors behind this AKP defeat, we must first count inflation and the rising cost of living, which have become unbearable for a large majority of the population.
It was therefore a painful setback for Erdogan, for whom continuing to occupy his position as Sultan is a priority for the survival of his reactionary regime. Israel’s genocidal war against the Palestinian people, and its subsequent offensives against Lebanon and Iran, provided an opportunity to restructure the political space by attempting to neutralize the opposition forces. Thus, since the beginning of the summer of 2024, the regime’s spokespersons have called for an "internal front", signifying a kind of national unity in the face of the risk of destabilization of neighbouring countries, not to mention a possible attack by Israel.
Of course, the probability of such an offensive by the Zionist state has no credibility. Because although the Turkish president likes to express his solidarity with the Palestinian cause, economic relations with Israel have not been affected. But Erdogan throughout his political trajectory and especially in order to make Turkey a regional power, has amply benefited from nationalist-militarist mobilizations in cases of international conflict, especially to ease political tensions within the country. So it was quite predictable that he would try to use the anti-Zionist popular sentiment to reforge his hegemony by neutralizing internal oppositional dynamics.
An international motif
It is in such a context of tensions and geopolitical conflict in the Middle East that, after some signs of rapprochement, the fascist leader Devlet Bahçeli finally called, on October 22, 2024, to everyone’s surprise, Abdullah Öcalan (designated as "the head of the terrorists") to come and speak in parliament to announce the end of the armed struggle and the dissolution of the PKK.
With Abdullah Öcalan in prison on the island of Imrali, off the coast of Istanbul since 1999, it would have been necessary to first lift his solitary confinement so that he could speak out and if the dismantling of his organization was announced, he could in return perhaps benefit from the "right to hope" which would allow him to be released despite his life sentence.
The fact that Bahçeli is the representative of the political movement most opposed to a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question and a supporter of violent repression was of course a source of suspicion. Moreover, neither the Dem Parti (pro-Kurdish left-wing party, the new name of the HDP), nor the AKP and the MHP seemed to be aware of this "invitation". It also took several days to understand whether Bahçeli and Erdogan were on the same wavelength, whether Erdogan was informed in advance of such a radical announcement. Or if Erdogan’s clique had already started a new dialogue with Öcalan, without Bahçeli ’s knowledge (and that of the entire public) and the latter, refusing to be excluded from such a process, had preferred to publicly raise the stakes as a bargaining chip. At this point, it is still difficult for us to know how the negotiations between the two components of the regime went. But it could rather be a "division of labour" between the two leaders, with Erdogan leaving Bahçeli the task of announcing the new project and preferring to observe the reactions, at least at the beginning.
The motive for such a project remains to be understood, announced so abruptly. It seems anachronistic given the weakness of the Kurdish movement within Turkish borders. The popular argument of the opposition was that in order to elect Erdogan once again as president in the next elections, the regime needed a change of constitution, and that in order to gather the 400 votes (out of 600) in parliament the AKP-MHP bloc needed the support of the Dem Party. However, the radical nature of the proposal could just as well have detached votes from the Islamist-nationalist bloc, because it must be understood that talking about the release of Öcalan, to whom even visits from his lawyers and family are forbidden, is a taboo subject, the very mention of which is punishable.
The motive must therefore have been international, a question of "national security" mainly related to the presence of an armed Kurdish movement in neighbouring countries. A destabilization of the regime in Iran and geopolitical chaos in the Middle East could of course have given strength to the Kurdish movement and allowed it to obtain territorial advances. But this option still seemed distant and did not explain the urgency of such a radical resolution of the conflict.
It was ultimately the accelerated fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 that clarified the impatience of Erdogan’s bloc to have Öcalan announce the dissolution of the PKK (and the PYD-YPG). The collapse of the Baathist dictatorship and the seizure of power by the HTS Salafists could have created a relationship of forces conducive to a consolidation and expansion of the autonomous Kurdish administration. Ankara, having of course been aware of the plan to overthrow the regime several weeks in advance and planning to take part in it through the so-called "Syrian National Army" which is under its control, undeniably hoped to defuse the risk of a consolidation of Kurdish autonomy under the new regime. Its relentless offensives on Rojava, led by the SNA and the Turkish military aviation, clearly show the urgency of the Turkish regime to put an end as quickly as possible to the existence of a Kurdish zone on its borders, especially before the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States on January 20, 2025.
Although Trump designates Erdogan as his friend, it is clear that the Kurds of Syria are for the moment, for both Washington and Tel Aviv, the main ally in the region, on the terrain. So it is quite possible that Trump, while trying to keep Erdogan at his side, will try to maintain a Kurdish armed presence on Syrian territory, not obviously out of democratic ambition, but to defend his interests as well as those of the Zionist state.
"A new paradigm" according to Öcalan
If the mystery of the motive is finally solved, the course of the negotiations remains unknown for the moment. The regime insists that the talks are only between the Turkish state, Öcalan and the Dem Party, without including the leadership of the PKK and the main figure of the Kurdish (civil) political movement, Selahattin Demirtaş. And apart from the release of Öcalan, no democratic measures are mentioned at the moment.
A first visit to Öcalan was made by the Dem delegation on December 28, 2024; here is the report:
At this meeting, where the latest developments in the Middle East and Turkey were analysed, Mr. Öcalan presented proposals for positive solutions to the dark scenarios that are being imposed on us.
Here is the general framework of his thoughts and approaches:
- Strengthening Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood again is a historical responsibility, while becoming of crucial and urgent importance for all peoples.
- For the success of the process, it is essential that all political spheres in Turkey take initiatives, act constructively and make a positive contribution without being drawn into narrow or circumstantial calculations. One of the most important arenas for these contributions will undoubtedly be the Turkish National Assembly (TBMM).
- The events in Gaza and Syria have shown that the resolution of this problem, which is being tried to turn into a gangrene through external interventions, can no longer be postponed. The contribution and proposals of the opposition are valuable in carrying out work that is proportionate to the gravity of this situation.
- I have the competence and determination to make a positive contribution to the new paradigm supported by Mr Bahçeli and Mr Erdoğan.
- My approach will be shared by the delegation with the state and political spheres. In light of these elements, I am ready to take the required positive step and launch the necessary appeal.
- All these efforts will help bring the country to the level it deserves and will at the same time be a valuable guide for democratic transformation. The current era is one of peace, democracy and brotherhood for Turkey and the region.
Although most of his remarks are limited to generalities, we can nevertheless be sure that the PKK leader supports this "new paradigm" and that he still feels respected enough to call for the organization to dissolve. On the other hand, his emphasis on the role of parliament and the opposition is also important, since the negotiations of 2013-2015 were mainly pursued between the intelligence services and Öcalan.
Peace and the resolution of the Kurdish question, one and the same thing?
The Dem Parti delegation is trying to make it different this time, despite all the vagueness surrounding the process. It is visiting all the parties represented in parliament to express Öcalan’s determination. The delegation also visited the former co-chairs of the HDP who are in prison.
Selahattin Demirtaş expressed his support in these terms:
"Although many people insistently avoid giving this process a name, for us it is the ’process of Democratization, Peace and Brotherhood’. As political actors operating on a democratic and peaceful basis, we wish, desire and support the definitive end of conflicts and violence. We affirm that if Mr. Öcalan takes an initiative in this regard when the conditions are ripe, we will be at his side. Any potential initiative is of course entirely up to him."
However, he did not fail to warn about the necessities (absent for the moment) of such a process, at a time when new town halls held by the Dem are under attack from the regime, their mayors dismissed and imprisoned, and villages in Rojava bombed:
"Everyone must know that there are certain good intentions and preparations made with these good intentions. However, for the process to take concrete form, tangible and reassuring steps must be taken quickly... A political peace can only be sustainable if it is achieved in a way that opens all avenues for social peace, that is, for democratization, equality, justice and freedoms. In this case, it will be beneficial for all, for the country as well as for its citizens."
Dem Parti MP and member of the current delegation (as well as the 2013 one) Sırrı Sureya Önder expresses the contradictions of the process as follows:
"In public opinion, the concepts of resolution [of the Kurdish issue] and peace are often confused. This is not correct. Peace can be established even by a simple embrace. Resolution, on the other hand, is a process of democratic and long-term struggle. The duration and depth of this process vary depending on the problematic areas. For now, what we are trying to build is peace." Resolution should therefore wait its turn...
As for Bahçeli , the leader of the nationalist far-right demanded that during a possible second visit to Öcalan (expected in the coming days), the "end of the organizational existence of the PKK" be declared. In the continuation of his speech, targeting the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, Bahçeli declared:
"East of the Euphrates, terrorism must either be eliminated or removed by force. We remain true to our position... Turkishness is the badge of honour of our existence. Terrorism cannot be negotiated, it can only be fought through struggle... There is no loser in peace, and no winner in war. In this case, we are ready for everyone to win through peace, and we are there."
From Diyarbakır, the most important Kurdish city in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan also called on the Kurds to seize this new opportunity:
"A new window of opportunity has opened for our country to end the scourge of terrorism once and for all. There is now a Turkey united among all its members that opposes oppression not only inside, but also outside the country... Terrorist organizations have no choice but to lay down their arms, we are giving them a chance to become a real political organization."
It is possible to observe from the speeches of the leaders of the Turkish regime that there is no question, for the moment, of democratic measures aimed at the recognition of the Kurdish identity. However, it is also necessary to discern the fact that re-entering negotiations with Öcalan is far from being easily acceptable in the Islamist-nationalist base of the regime, so it is also necessary to see the part of rhetoric aimed at convincing this audience. On the other hand, the regime is probably seeking to weaken the armed movement as much as possible before subjecting it to concrete negotiation measures.
What will be the conditions for Öcalan to agree to make a call to his organization? Will the various parties on the ground, PKK, PYD, YPG ... - all of which have their share of relative autonomy - agree, and to what extent, to lay down their arms? Although the PKK leadership claims to support Öcalan’s steps towards peace, it clearly emphasizes that no sign of a new process is perceptible within the state. In the event of refusal to make this call or to bury their weapons, will a new wave of repression and violence be unleashed against the civil and armed movement?
Many contradictions and indecisions run through this new process which, as Demirtaş noted, still has no name.
But even without a name, even fragile, even traversed by mistrust, hope remains hope.
From Istanbul, January 15, 2025