Version imprimableSince 2021, Rwanda had activated and supported the M23 militia with weapons and men. It had succeeded in seizing a large part of the territories in the eastern region of the DRC, including the two regional capitals, Goma and Bukavu. African structures through mediation in Nairobi, Luanda and then Dar es Salaam had proved futile.
The involvement of the US
To everyone’s surprise, Qatar managed to bring together the presidents of the DRC and Rwanda, Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame, for a one-on-one meeting. A few weeks later, the two foreign ministers of the warring countries, under the leadership of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, signed a declaration of principles in Washington. This recognises ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State.’ The two countries also commit to ‘ceasing all support to armed groups.’ This refers to Rwanda’s support for the M23, but also to the links between the DRC’s armed forces and the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), a group founded by Hutu génocidaires. All these commitments had already been made during previous meetings organised by African diplomats, but what is new is the economic aspect.
A stranglehold on minerals
Having failed to secure military support from African countries, Tshisekedi turned to the United States, proposing a deal: access to Congolese minerals in exchange for US protection. Trump showed interest and sent his special envoy Massad Boulos to begin discussions. As for Paul Kagame, he offered his country as a refuge for those expelled from the US. This was a similar proposal he had already made to the former Conservative government in Britain. As a sign of good will, the M23 withdrew from the town of Wakilake near the tin mine operated by Alphamin, a US company.
The agreement in principle includes ‘support for regional economic integration, in particular through transparency in the supply chains of critical minerals’. In addition, Trump has promised massive private and public investment in the region.
Numerous obstacles
This agreement is not necessarily to the advantage of the DRC because, in the value chain, the country risks being confined to a mineral reserve extracted by US companies, with Rwanda providing the logistics for export. But the situation is complex. The M23, which controls large parts of the Kivu region, is primarily concerned with securing land ownership for the Tutsi community. Negotiations between Kinshasa and the armed group have stalled because the latter is demanding integration into the army and, above all, into the institutions. In reality, the Kivu region would be economically integrated into Rwanda and politically controlled by the M23.
Chinese companies control the vast majority of the mining sector in the DRC, which means that the US will have to undertake lengthy and costly prospecting work and establish itself in territories controlled by the many existing militias. Finally, it is not certain that the other neighbouring country, Uganda, will welcome this agreement, which marginalises it. It could in turn be tempted to support armed groups.
8 May 2025
Translated by International Viewpoint from l’Anticapitaliste.
