Version imprimableWhy Prime Minister Takaichi Called a Snap General Election
Last October, the Takaichi administration was established through a coalition between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). Regarding this administration, we pointed out;
This occurred in a context where the left is decisively weak within Japanese politics, particularly in the parliamentary arena, and where social movements and mass movements also lack significant influence. Consequently, the left does not pose a perceived threat to the conservative-centrist forces. This occurred due to a combination of factors; increasing sense of crisis within the LDP over the fact that the former ruling coalition of LDP and Komeito lost its majority in the House of Councillors following the House of Representatives, that an far-right party positioned to the right of the LDP made significant gains, and that a portion of the LDP’s conservative supporters shifted their allegiance to the far-right; the changing balance of power between the Democratic Party for the People and the Japan Innovation Party within the center-right bloc, combined with the Constitutional Democratic Party’s inability to take political initiative as the largest opposition party, created the conditions for Sanae Takaichi to be elected LDP president and subsequently nominated as prime minister. However, as the article also points out, the Takaichi administration’s foundation is not rock-solid, and its policy options are not entirely unrestricted. [1]
Furthermore, we analysed: “In any case, the Takaichi administration is fundamentally a transitional government. In this sense, we must recognize that political realignment within the conservative-centrist bloc will continue for a certain period, potentially even drawing in far-right parties to some extent. The problem is that the left is being completely left out of this political realignment process.” The current political situation is unfolding precisely as predicted.
For the mainstream Japanese bourgeoisie, securing political stability and implementing pro-capital economic policies within that stability is paramount. In that sense, “Taiwan contingency” remarks by Takaichi were by no means welcomed by them. On January 5th, Masayoshi Matsumoto, Chairperson of the Kansai Economic Federation (and President of Sumitomo Electric), revealed their frustration when he stated: “I shudder to think what would have happened if that comment had been made during the (Osaka/Kansai) Expo,” “I’m saying that was completely unacceptable. She needs to handle things more skillfully,” and “Problems will inevitably arise if Japan, sandwiched between the two major powers (the US and China), charges ahead unilaterally” (January 5th, Sankei News).
For the Takaichi administration, “without political stability, we cannot advance robust economic policies, diplomacy, and security” (January 5th press conference). Achieving a stable government was a fervent desire for her, but two options existed to reach it. One involved expanding the coalition framework to include the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP), forming a LDP-JIP-DPFP coalition to secure a majority in the Diet. This approach was reportedly promoted by Deputy President Aso and Secretary-General Suzuki. It is likely that most of the bourgeoisie desired this path. The other option was to leverage Prime Minister Takaichi’s high approval ratings to call a snap general election, aiming for an absolute majority in the House of Representatives. This is precisely the path chosen this time.
Prime Minister Takaichi chose the latter path, likely confident in her high approval ratings. This decision was also influenced by DPFP’s indecisiveness over joining the coalition (compounded by its supporting organization, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation, firmly opposing such a move). Furthermore, if the regular Diet session proceeded as planned, issues like rising prices, money scandal, “the Unification Church” issue, the “Taiwan contingency” remarks and increasing tensions between Japan and China, “nuclear possession” comments by a senior government official, and suspicions surrounding JIP lawmakers’ avoidance of national health insurance. She likely judged that the government couldn’t withstand opposition scrutiny on these critical issues without risking a dent in her crucial high approval ratings. However, this general election carries significant instability: Komeito Party’s withdrawal from the coalition, electoral competition with the JIP in constituencies, and pressure from the far-right Sanseito (Party of Do it Yourself). For Takaichi, this is undoubtedly a major gamble.
The Background of forming the “Centrist Reform Coalition” by CDP and Komeito
Meanwhile, as a form of the political realignment within the conservative-centrist forces, a new party, the “Centrist Reform Coalition” was established by CDP and Komeito. Members of the House of Representatives from both parties left their respective parties to join the new party. In the general election, Komeito withdrew entirely from single-seat constituencies, supporting CDP’s candidates there in exchange for being placed higher on the unified proportional representation lists.
CDP leader Noda stated at a January 15th meeting of both houses’ Diet members, “We had been in contact with Komeito behind the scenes since around the time of last September’s leadership election of LDP.” Komeito leader Saito also told reporters, “After concluding the LDP-Komeito coalition last October, we established the broad policy of ‘becoming the axis of centrist reform’ and have been working to unite political forces.” This indicates the formation of this new centrist party was secretly prepared.
At that time, Komeito raised five banners for “centrist reform”: ▽Building a new social security model that provides security for the working generation ▽Realizing an inclusive society that expands choices and possibilities ▽Doubling per capita GDP (gross domestic product), directly linked to the richness of life ▽Realistic foreign and defense policies and constitutional revision (!) ▽Resolute political reform and the realization of electoral system reform. And even in forming this “Centrist Reform Coalition,” Komeito is likely to use these five pillars as a litmus test, as evidenced by the statement: “Komeito is demanding that the new party maintain its major policies”, and Saito stated, “Those who agree with the new party’s principles will gather. There shouldn’t be anyone who can’t agree” (Mainichi Shimbun, January 16th).
Komeito has held the view that regarding the current international political framework, “Division and confrontation are advancing globally, with far-right and far-left forces rising. Amidst Japan’s own political shift to the right, it is crucial to unite centrist reform forces” (January 16, Komeito Newspaper). While this partially reflects an accurate assessment of the situation, it is aiming to pull liberals in CDP to centrist-right through the formation of the “Centrist Reform Coalition.”
The background to Komeito’s decision to establish a new party is said to be the weakening of its supporting organization, the Soka Gakkai. With the aging of activists who had actively carried out election campaigns and changes in the mindset of Soka Gakkai members, the dissolution of the coalition with the LDP made re-election in single-seat districts increasingly uncertain. Meanwhile, votes in proportional representation districts have been steadily declining. Under these circumstances, it likely became difficult for Komeito to continue shouldering national elections as it had done before.
On CDP side, the political realignment was spearheaded by party conservatives like Noda. Their repeated statements since last autumn regarding the security legislation – such as Noda’s claim that “in the ten years since enactment, I know of no instance where it could be clearly said to be unconstitutional,” and former Chairperson Edano’s assertion that “there are no unconstitutional parts, so there’s no need to change it” – now reveal themselves as groundwork for cooperation with Komeito. In a sense, even though the sudden dissolution and general election accelerated the timeline, CDP had also been meticulously preparing for a center-right coalition.
The January 15th general meeting of CDP lawmakers of the Diet, held after an hour-long closed-door consultation, was no longer a forum for debate but a venue for applauding approval of the new party proposal. Watching the broadcast, it seemed a fair number of lawmakers did not applaud, but on the surface, it was unanimously approved.
The platform of the “Centrist Reform Coalition” clearly aligns with Komeito’s five pillars. The fourth pillar states: “Advance realistic foreign and defense policies centered on the Japan-U.S. alliance and peace diplomacy, based on the Constitution’s pacifism and exclusive defense, to safeguard the peace and security of the people.” While Komeito’s “constitutional revision” became “deepening constitutional revision discussions,” and the addition of “based on the Constitution’s pacifism” suggests a compromise between Komeito and the Constitutional Democratic Party, the platform clearly leans significantly “to the right” from CDP’s traditional stance, as evidenced by assertions like “the security legislation is constitutional.” Amidst this situation, many of CDP supporters said “We can no longer support CDP.” During the 2017 political realignment surrounding the “Party of Hope,” the declaration by Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike to “exclude liberals” prompted the refusal to merge into the “Party of Hope,” leading to the formation of the former Constitutional Democratic Party. So what about this time? Will they follow the majority for now, using the excuse that the new party is merely an electoral alliance for this general election? (Then actually almost all the lawmakers joined the new party.)
However, the problem confronting the left (including us) remains; in such political realignment processes, the left is completely left out of the loop.
Make the General Election a Chance to Reject the LDP-IJP Coalition Government
Meanwhile, the left forces in the Diet are also rushing to prepare for the general election. However, the reality is that they lack a strategy or policy capable of breaking through their current marginalization and isolation.
For example, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) stated in a Central Committee Executive Bureau declaration: “If one looks only at the ‘surface of politics,’ where many major opposition parties now pander to the Takaichi administration, Japanese politics may appear to be overwhelmed by right-wing currents. However, this is deeply contradictory to the ‘deep currents of society’—the earnest demands of many citizens and global trends.” It argues that victory can be achieved by ”aggressively articulating and spreading a vision of a future society where ‘human freedom’ flourishes abundantly... integrated with policy appeals based on popular demands." However, the “policy appeals based on public demands” and the “future society vision” are presented as parallel concepts, lacking the perspective of transitional demands that bridge them.
Furthermore, SDP leader Fukushima stated at a press conference, “Politics must address fundamental issues like consumption tax reduction, inflation, and healthcare/welfare. The SDP strongly protests the dissolution of the Diet while abandoning all these responsibilities.” “The SDP will accept the challenge. We will field multiple candidates nationwide.” However, with the loss of a House of Representatives seat following the departure of Representative Arakaki, the party undoubtedly finds itself in an extremely difficult situation.
In this political climate, while we lack our own candidate to embody our political stance, we must continue to criticize the Takaichi administration’s policies of military expansion and war preparations, its destruction of livelihoods, and its prioritization of capital interests in every possible forum. We must urge voters to reject the LDP-IJP coalition government in the general election.
January 19, 2026
Translated by Tsutomu Teramoto from weekly Kakehashi, January 26, 2026
